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IN THE SUPREME COU&T 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 19978 
MARK A. WOOD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v s . 
HARRY M. WEENIG and ERMA P. 
WEENIG, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a fraudulent conveyance action to set aside the conveyance 
by defendant Harry M. Weenig of his interest in his residence to his 
wife, defendant Erma P. Weenig, so that sucth residence may be levied 
upon in partial satisfaction of a $200,000 judgment against Harry M. 
Weening with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum from 
February 1, 1974. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On February 6, 1980, plaintiff was granted a default judgment 
against defendant Erma P. Weenig which provided that the conveyance 
of Harry M. Weenig1 s interest in the residence of the defendants to 
Erma P. Weenig constituted a fraudulent conveyance as to plaintiff and 
that plaintiff could levy upon such interest in partial satisfaction of his 
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$200,000 judgment. On May 2, 1984, defendant Erma P. Weenig moved 
the lower court to set aside such default judgment under Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and such motion was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant's seek to have the order denying their motion for relief 
from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utab Rules of Civil Procedure 
reversed and the default judgment set aside. 
STATEMENT OF FAClfS 
On February 1, 1974, plaintiff obtained a judgment against 
defendant, Harry M. Weenig (Harry) , in the Marion Circuit Court, 
State of Indiana, for the sum of $200,000.00, plus interest thereon at 8 
percent per annum and costs incurred therein. (R. at 77, 112 and 
150) On June 21, 1976, that judgment was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals for the State of Indiana, Second District. (R. at 77 and 112) 
On ^February 14, 1977, the Indiana judgment was reduced to a judgment 
in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah in the 
amount of $200,000.00 plus interest thereon at 8 percent per annum. 
(R. at 77, 81-82, 112 and 150) On February 16, 1977, said judgment 
was docketed in the Clerk1 s Office of the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. ( Id . ) 
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On August 10, 1976, plaintiff, in conducting supplemental 
proceedings to determine the availability of assets of Harry M. Weenig 
for satisfaction of such judgment, took the deposition of said defendant. 
(R. at 77-78, 112 and 149) One day prior to such deposition, 
defendant Harry M. Weenig, t ransferred all r ight , title and interest 
which he had in the real property where he resides located at 4464 
Covecrest Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah to his wife, defendant Erma P. 
Weenig (Erma). (R. at 77-78, 83, 112 and 149-50) On July 30, 1979, 
plaintiff initiated an action in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County against Harry M. Weenig and his wife Erma P. 
Weenig, seeking to set aside such transfer as a fraudulent conveyance. 
(R. at 2-4, 113, 150, 151 and 154) In addition, on July 30, 1979, the 
deposition of defendant, Erma P. Weenig, was noticed by plaintiff and a 
copy of such notice was mailed to defendant Erma P. Weenig at 4464 
Covecrest Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. (R. at 8, 113 and 155) 
On August 9, 1979, process in the fraudulent conveyance action 
was served upon Erma P. Weenig by Frank E. Spriggs, Deputy 
Constable for John A. Sindt, Constable Murray Precinct, by leaving a 
copy of the Summons and Complaint with Mrs. Weenig1 s daughter , at 
Mrs. Weenig's usual place of abode. (R. at 113 and 159-67) 
Mrs. Weenig's daughter was a person of suitable age and discretion 
there residing over the age of fourteen. ( I d . ) Mrs. Weenig's daughter 
refused to open the door of Erma's home at the time service was made. 
Instead, she communicated with the constable through an intercom 
communication system having a speaker on the front porch of Weenig's 
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home. Id. Because the constable was unsuccessful in getting the 
daughter to open the door and accept servipe for Erma P. Weenig, he 
told the daughter he was serving Erma P. Weenig by leaving the papers 
with the daughter. He then put the complaint and summons face down 
on the porch of Weenig's home. Because she would not identify 
herself, the daughter was referred to as Jane Doe, daughter , in the 
return made by the Constable's office. (R. at 112-13 and 159-67.) 
The testimony of Frank E. Spriggs, deputy constable, concerning 
service of process was as follows: 
Q Could you tell us the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the service of that complaint and summons? 
A Well, as near as I can remember, it was on an 
afternoon in August, and I went to the home on Covecrest 
Drive. I knocked on the door. I don't remember whether I 
knocked on the door or rang the bell, but anyway a young 
woman answered through an intercom system. I identified 
myself as a deputy constable and asked if one of the parents 
were home, and they indicated they weren't . I asked who 
she was, and she indicated that she was the daughter of the 
defendants. I asked if she was over the age of 14, and she 
answered that she was. I asked her name, and she refused 
to answer. I asked her to come to the door. She refused. 
After about 10 minutes of this kind of going on, I got upset 
and told the person that I was going to fill a summons and 
complaint out and leave it on the porch, and they said that 
they did not have to accept it and I just said, you are 
served. 
And I left. 
Q Was there any communication by the woman or girl 
at the door concerning instructions that she had received 
from her father at all in regard to legal papers? 
A Yes. She said her Dad said that she didn't have 
to answer the door. (R. at 33) 
The constable's wife testified that she overheard the following 
conversation at the time of service: 
. . . I heard her say that she would not open the door, 
and that she had been instructed not to accept any papers 
concerning her father's business . (R. at 171) 
On August 28, 1979, an Amended Complaint In such fraudulent 
conveyance action was filed naming two additional defendants. 
Inasmuch as Erma P. Weenig had not filed an answer to the original 
Complaint, the Amended Complaint was not served upon her in 
accordance with Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as 
follows (R. at 155-56): 
No service need be made on parties in default for failure to 
appear except that pleadings assert ing new or additional 
claims for relief against them shall be served upon them in 
the manner provided for service of Summons in Rule 4. 
On February 6, 1980, pursuant to minute entry of the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District Court Judge, defendant Erma P. 
Weenig's default was entered and plaintiff was granted a default 
judgment. (R. at 115 and 156) Such judgment stated that the 
conveyance of real property located at 4464 Covecrest Drive, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, by Harry M. Weenig to Erma P. Weenig was fraudulent as 
to Mr. Weenig's creditors as follows: 
. . . It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the 
conveyance from Harry M. Weenig to Erma P. Weenig of real 
property located at 4464 Covecrest Drive, Salt Lake City, Salt 
Lake County, Utah, reflected by Quitclaim Deed dated 
August 9, 1976 is hereby disregarded and Plaintiff is hereby 
granted a Writ of Execution upon the property so conveyed. 
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Defendants and respondants, Harry M. and Erma P. Weenig 
(Weenigs), filed a motion in the lower court to have the default 
judgment set aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure on the basis that service of process upon her was improper 
Such motion came on for an evidentuary hearing before the Third 
District Court on May 2, 1984, at 10:00 a[m. , before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, without a jury . At the conclusion of that 
evidentuary hearing, Judge Frederick refjused to set the default 
judgment aside. His ruling was based on the fact that Erma had failed 
(a) to set forth a meritorious defense to the fraudulent conveyance 
action; (b) to timely file her motion for relief from judgment under 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and (c) that service 
of the summons and complaint on Erma was ih compliance with Rule 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 1^6-117; 175-76). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS 
IT WAS BASED ON THE TRIAL COURTTS EVALUTAION OF THE 
* CREDITABILITY OF THE WITNESSES AND THEIR EVIDENCE 
At the hearing in the lower court on May 2, 1984, plaintiff and 
defendant presented evidence in support of and in opposition to the 
motion of Erma to set aside the default judgment. At the conclusion of 
such evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Honorable J . Dennis 
Frederick determined that plaintiff's witnesses were more believeable 
than defendants and found in plaintiff1 s favor on that basis as follows: 
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The court: very well. With regard to this matter, 
counsel, as is generally the case, the issues here would have 
to do with the credibUty of the witnesses because there is 
conflicting testimony. The court has not been impressed with 
the candor or testimony of Mrs. Weenig. It has not been 
convincing. As far as I am concerned, the evidence has 
established that the elements comprising the tests set forth in 
the Musselman case, the 1983 case, have not been met. 
Accordingly, the motion to set aside the default judgment is 
denied. (R. at 175-76) (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if the findings 
of the trial court are supported by evidence which is substantial , 
competent and admissable, its judgment will not be substi tuted for that 
of the trial court . Dang v. Cox Corp . , 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 1982); 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981); Meese v . Brigham Young 
University, 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981); Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290 
(Utah 1975); Peopled Finance and Thrift Company of Ogden v . Doman, 
27 Utah 2d 404, 497 P.2d 17 (Utah 1972); Staples Excavation and 
Erection Co. v . Weyher Construction Co. , 26 Utah 2d 387, 490 P.2d 330 
(Utah 1971); and De Vas v . Noble, 13 Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d 290 (Utah 
1962). This is because the trial court , having heard and viewed the 
witnesses and their testimony, is in a bet ter position to weigh and 
evaluate the same. The rule is best stated in Staples Excavation at 333 
as follows: 
It would appear that this court is asked to review issues 
of fact ra ther than issues of law. A review of the pert inent 
parts of the record before us leads us to the conclusion that 
the trial court could fairly and reasonably remain unconvinced 
that the appellants here had established their claim of 
damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Being an 
action at law, we are not at liberty to interfere with the 
findings of the court below unless such findings are arbi t rary 
or have no basis in the record. In the case before us the 
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record reveals numerous and wide conflicts in the evidence 
which only the trial judge was in a position to evaluate. As 
to the appellants1 claim that the court failed to give proper 
credance to the testimony of their witnesses which was 
uncontradicted, this too was a matter for the trial court to 
weigh. 
A review of the record fails to establish a reasonable 
basis to reverse the decision of the court below. The 
decision of the trial court having been made upon disputed 
and contradictory evidence, it would appear that the rule we 
have enunciated in numerous cases, that the trial court being 
in an advantaged position from having heard the testimony of 
the witnesses and observed their demeanor is bet ter able to 
determine issues of fact than is this court upon a written 
record. We therefore conclude that the decision and judgment 
of the court below must be affirmed. 
The rule is further supported by the case of Tonelson v. Haines, 
2 Ariz. App. 127 406 P.2d 845 (1965) cited by appellants in their brief. 
In that case, the appellate court left to the trial court the task of 
evaluating the credibi l i ty of the witnesses and their evidence. In so 
doing, the court affirmed the lower court 's decision that service of 
process was improper. 
In the present case the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Third 
District Court Judge, decided in plain tiff's favor because the 
defendant's witnesses were unbelievable. His findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were entered in accordance therewith. As stated 
numerous times by this court , the trial court is in a better position to 
evaluate the creditability of the witnesses and the par ty 's evidence and 
will not be reversed on appeal if there is evidence in support of such 
findings and the trial court has not abused iis discretion. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS DEFENDANT 
FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIRMENTS FOR SETTING 
ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
In their docketing statement at 5, Weenigs state that the trial 
court errored in refusing to set aside the default judgment against Erma 
on the basis that (a) she was not served in this action in accordance 
with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and (b) she has a 
meritorious defense to the fraudulent conveyance action which she 
should have been permitted to raise. The problem with those issues is 
that the lower court specifically found that Erma was served in 
accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
record on appeal is utterly void of any meritorious defense which she 
may have to the fraudulent conveyance action. She did not raise a 
meritorious defense in the lower court . The first time that a 
meritorious defense was raised by Erma was in the docketing statement, 
filed with the Utah Supreme Court, at 2 where she states that the 
conveyance which plaintiff alleges was fraudulent as to himself was made 
by Harry M. Weenig to Erma P. Weenig for good and valuable 
consideration. 
In order for Weenigs to have the default judgment set aside, they 
must satisfy three requirements as set forth in the recent Utah Supreme 
Court case of State of Utah v . Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 
1983) as follows: 
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In order for the defendant to be relieved from the 
default judgment, he must not only show that the judgment 
was entered against him through excusable neglect [or any 
other reason specified in Rule 60(b) ] , but he must also show 
that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and that 
he has a meritorious defense to the actibn. 
Weenig's have failed to satisfy those three requirements as is shown by 
the record below. 
a. Defendants motion to set aside judgment was untimely. 
Erma made her motion to set aside the default judgment under Rule 
60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a 
party may be relieved from a final judgment as follows: 
On motion upon such terms as are just , the court may in 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order , or proceeding 
for the following reasons . . . (4) when, for any cause, the 
Summons in an action has not been personally served upon 
the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant 
has failed to appear in said action . . . . The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1) , (2) , (3) 
or (4) , not more than three months after the judgment, order 
or proceeding was entered or taken. (emphasis added) 
Rule 60(b) is clear that a motion for relief from a judgment based 
upon improper service of the Summons must be made within three 
months of the judgment. In this action, the judgment was entered on 
February 6, 1980, and docketed on February 8, 1980. Erma's motion 
was made more than four years after the entrance and docketing of said 
judgment. Said motion was clearly outside the time requirement set forth 
in Rule 60(b). 
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In the lower court , Erma relied upon the case of Woody v. 
Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 249, 461 P.2d 465 (1969) for the proposition that 
the three month provision of Rule 60(b) has no application where 
service of process is defective. Defendants and respondants have also 
cited such case as controlling in their docketing statement filed in this 
court. That case is inapplicable to the case presently before the court 
for several reasons. First , the summons and complaint in this case 
were properly served upon defendant Erma P. Weenig at her usual place 
of abode by leaving the same with her daughter who was a person of 
suitable age and discretion there residing. Second, in the Woody case 
an ambiquity arose as to which defendant process was being served 
upon. In Woody, process was left with the wife of one of the 
defendants but the re turn indicated that it had been served upon 
another of the defendants who did not reside at the home where service 
was made. Because of the ambiquity, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that service was defective and the three month period was inapplicable. 
In the present case, there is no such ambiquity. It is clear from both 
the summons and the re tu rn , the testimony below and the lower court 's 
findings that service was being made upon Erma P. Weenig and that she 
was the person who needed to respond to the complaint in order to 
avoid a default judgment being entered against her . 
Third, not only was defendant Erma P. Weenig properly served 
with the summons and complaint in this action, but she received notice 
of such case pursuant to a notice of deposition which was mailed to her 
personally and a notice of lis pendens which was recorded with the Salt 
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Lake County Recorder on the real property in which she resided. It is 
therefore clear that the Woody case is distinquishable, that the time 
period of Rule 60(b) is inapplicable and the lower court 's decision 
should be summarily affirmed in accordance with the lower court 's 
finding that Erma's motion was untimely. 
b . The lower court 's judgment should be affirmed as defendant Erma 
P. Weenig failed to present a meritorious defense. 
As set forth in the Musselman case, a default judgment will not be 
set aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless 
the defendant sets forth a meritorious defense to the complaint in said 
action. The record on appeal is void of any evidence, or even 
arguments or statements of counsel, as to a meritorious defense which 
Erma P. Weenig may have to the fraudulent conveyance action. The 
first time that Erma raised a meritorious defense is in the docketing 
statement at 2 where she states that the conveyance of the home by 
Harry M. to Erma P. Weenig was made for good and valuable 
consideration. The law is clear and this court has repeatedly held that 
matters, including evidence, Mnot offered at the hearing cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal." Utah Department of 
Transportation v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1979); Edgar v . 
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Reliable Furniture Co. v . Fidelity 
and Guarantee Insurance Underwriters, I nc . , 14 Utah 2d 169 380 P.2d 
135 (Utah 1963); and Pilcher v . State, Dept. of Social Services, 663 
P.2d 450 (Utah 1983). 
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Counsel for Wood has reviewed the t ranscript of the lower court 
proceeding as well as the record in an attempt to discover any evidence 
or mention of a meritorious defense which Erma may have presented to 
the lower court . The only mention of a meritorious defense is contained 
in Finding of Fact number 15 (R. at 116) and Conclusion of Law number 
4 (R. at 117). Both the finding of fact and conclusion of law of the 
lower court state in effect that defendant Erma P. Weenig failed to 
present any evidence that would suggest or establish a meritorious 
defense to the fraudulent conveyance action. Inasmuch as Erma failed 
to present a meritorious defense to the fraudulent conveyance action in 
the lower court , she is precluded from doing so for the first time on 
appeal. 
c. The lower court judgment should be affirmed as service of process 
on defendant Erma P. Weenig was in accordance with Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Weenigs state in their docketing statement and Ln Appellant's Brief 
that the summons and complaint in the fraudulent conveyance action was 
not personally served upon defendant as required by Rule 4(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For that reason they argue they should 
be granted relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) of such rules . 
Such argument is directly contrary to the conclusion of law of the lower 
court (R. at 116 1F 1) which states as follows: 
The summons and complaint in the above-entitled fraudulent 
conveyance action were properly served in accordance with 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure upon defendant 
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Erma P. Weenig by Frank E. Spriggs, Deputy Constable for 
John A. Sindt, Constable, Murray Precinct, by leaving a 
copy thereof at Mrs. Weenig1 s usual place of abode with her 
daughter over the age of fourteen, who qualified as a person 
of suitable age and discretion there residing. 
It is also contrary to the decision of courts from other jurisdictions 
which have held on similar facts that service of process was proper in 
accordance with rules for service similar to those contained in Rule 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. business and Professional 
Adjustment Co. v. Baker, 62 Or. App. 237, 659 P.2d 1025 (Or. App. 
1983) and United Pacific Insurance Co. v . Discount Co. , 15 Wash. App. 
559, 550 P.2d 699 (1976). 
In the Baker case, the constable knocked on the door of the 
defendant's residence in order to serve the summons and complaint upon 
him. The defendant yelled in a loud voice for the constable to go 
away. The constable recognized the defendant by his voice because he 
had communicated with him on a prior occasion for forty-five minutes. 
The constable responded in a loud voice that he was serving the papers 
and that the defendant had been served. The constable then left the 
papers on the front porch. The Oregon appellate court specifically 
held* that service upon the defendant was proper and that a defendant 
could not avoid service by refusing to identify himself or accept the 
papers as follows: 
The rules do not require an actual in-hand delivery, or a 
face-to-face encounter with an acknowledgement of identity 
from the person to be served, as defendant argues they do. 
To so require would allow a defendant to defeat service 
simply by refusing to identify himself or accept the papers . 
It would make personal service a degrading game of wiles and 
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t r icks , ra ther than a procedure for insuring that a defendant 
received actual notice of the subject and pendancy of an 
action. 
Baker at 1027. 
In the United Pacific case, the defendant opened the front door of 
her residence in the process servers presence. When the process 
server told her who he was and that he had some legal papers for her , 
she slammed the door knocking the papers from his hand. The process 
server then stated in a loud voice that she had been served and left. 
The papers never actually touched the defendant's hand but were 
knocked from the constable's possession by the action of the defendant 
in slamming the door. The Washington Appellant Court held at 700-01 
that service of process was valid as follows: 
RCW 4.28.080 provides in par t : 
The summons shall be served by delivering a copy 
thereof as follows: 
(9) If the suit be against a company or corporation 
other than those designated in the proceeding subdivisions of 
this section, to the president or other head of the company 
or corporation, secretary, cashier, or managing agent thereof 
or to the secretary, stenographer or office assistant of the 
president or other head of the company or corporation, 
secretary, cashier or managing agent. 
(14) In all other cases to the defendant personally, or 
by leaving a copy of the summons at the house of his usual 
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then 
resident therein. 
Service made in the modes provided in this section shall 
be taken and be held to be personal service. 
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# * # # 
The facts in the case at bench demonstrate a clear 
attempt by the process server to yield possession and control 
of the documents to Mrs. Norelius while he was positioned in 
a manner to accomplish that act. Normal "delivery" thereof 
would have been affected upon Mrs. Norelius except for her 
obvious attempt to evade service by slamming the door after 
the papers had been held out to her . The summons need not 
actually be placed in the defendant's hand. We find, as did 
the trial court, that facts in the recor4 supported conclusion 
that "delivery" occurred and service wa^ effected. 
Appellants argue in their brief at 12-14J that the reasoning of the 
Arizona Appellate Court in Tonelson V. Haines, 2 Ariz. App. 127, 406 
P.2d 845 (1965) should be adopted by thi$ court to the effect that 
service is not valid unless the person being served knows papers are 
being left with him. The problem with appellant's argument is that the 
Tonelson decision is based on a specific finding of the lower court that 
the person there being served was unaware that service was being 
attempted and she did not do anything to defeat service. The lower 
court in this case made opposite findings and conclusions. 
Contrary to appellant's arguments, the holding in Tonelson is 
simply that the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for the 
trial^ court as to the credibility of the witnesses and their evidence. 
This is clear from the language of the court at 846-847 as follows: 
After hearing the evidence, the trial court found as 
follows: 
"There is no dispute in the evidence in 
relation to the fact that the defendant was at his 
home at the time in question; as to the fact that 
Mr. Estein called at the defendant's home at the 
time in question; as to the fact that Mrs. Haines 
was then a member of the family of the defendant 
and that the same Mrs. Haines answered the door; 
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and that the copy of the complaint and summons 
were not physically placed in the possession of 
Mrs. Haines at the time in question. The court 
need not decide the law point as to whether or not 
the leaving of a copy of the complaint and summons 
on the premises and in the vicinity of an individual 
following that in dividual1 s refusal to accept the same 
constitutes good service." 
"The purpose of the visit of Mr. Estein was 
not presented to Mrs. Haines in such manner that 
she heard and understood the fact that Mr. Estein 
was there for the purpose of serving process upon 
the defendant. This being so, the fact of leaving 
the same between the screen door and the front 
door does not constitute service. There was no 
intentional act on the par t of Mrs. Haines designed 
to knowingly attempt to defeat the service of 
process ." 
On appeal, the contention is made that the undisputed 
facts constitute service as a matter of law and that the trial 
court neither had discretion, nor abused its discretion, in 
setting aside the default and default judgment. 
In Eldridge v . Jagger , 83 Ariz. 150, 317 P.2d 942 
(1957), our Supreme Court said: 
"It is a well-established rule of law that the 
re turn of service of process can be impeached only 
by clear and convincing evidence." 83 Ariz. 150, 
152, 317 P.2d 942, 943. 
In this same case, however, the court also said: 
"However, the trial judge, in hearing the testimony 
and in observing the demeanor and manner of the 
witnesses in testifying as to conflicting facts, 
concluded that the defendant Jagger had not been 
served with summons and should be given an 
opportunity to litigate a disputed obligation. 
Wehave repeatedly held an application to open, 
vacate or set aside a judgment is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and its action will not 
be distrubed by this court except for a clear abuse 
of discretion." 83 Ariz. 150, 152, 317 P.2d 942, 
944. 
We hold that in order for there to be a" * * * leaving 
* * * with * * *" a person a copy of the summons and 
complaint, as required by Rule 4 ( d ) , supra , such person 
must be aware of the "leaving." We have not been cited a 
decision directly in point. Generally, when personal service 
is attempted, the person served must be apprised in some 
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that the person "with" whom the papers are left must have 
knowledge that the papers are so left. Otherwise service 
might be accomplished by surreptitously placeing papers in a 
person1 s pocket, or by other means not likely to bring about 
actual notice. 
In this case the evidence is "clear" that Mrs. Haines did 
not have any knowledge of the leaving of this summons with 
her . Whether it is "convincing" we feel should be left up to 
the trial court under the Jagger decision. It was the trial 
court1 s function, and not ours , to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses and we hold that we are bound by its decision in 
this regard. (emphasis added) 
In the present case, the lower court specifically found that 
defendant's daughter resided at the usual place of abode of Erma P. 
Weenig, that she was over the age of fourteen and that she was a 
person of suitable age and discretion. Th& court further found that 
service was made at such usual place of abode and that service was 
properly made upon Erma by delivering a copy of the summons and 
complaint to her daughter by leaving the same on the front porch after 
the daughter refused to open the front door to accept service of 
process. If the trial court or this court were to hold that such facts 
do not constitute proper service, a defendant could avoid service of 
process and jurisdiction of the court over him by simply refusing to 
take possession of the summons and complaint. Such would result in a 
moc£ery of the judicial system. The lower court judgment should be 
summarily affirmed as there is no question that service of process was 
valid in this case. Defendants cannot avoid service by refusing to 
accept process and instructing residents of their household to do the 
same. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons Wood respectfully requests that the 
judgment of the lower court be summarily affirmed. 
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